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ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BECAUSE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST.

The crux of this appeal is found in the following sentence from Del-Rio's Brief:1
Shaw and the Federal Plaintiffs never reached a funding agreement as
contemplated by the 1995 Agreement, though Shaw did advance approximately $20,000 to Del-Rio for litigation costs. Aplee's. Br. at 7.
It is undisputed that Shaw committed in the 1995 Agreement to use his best efforts to
enter into a funding agreement with the Federal Plaintiffs under which Shaw would
provide up to $30,000 in funding for the Federal Litigation. Shaw admits in his Answer
and his affidavit mat he subsequently did reach an agreement to provide funding for the
Federal Litigation and that he actually provided approximately $20,000 in funding for the
Federal Litigation to Del-Rio and the Federal Plaintiffs. R. 173 (f 6). The question,
which remains unanswered, is why and under what terms did Shaw provide this funding.
Plaintiffs maintain that Shaw's performance of his obligations under the 1995 Agreement
by entering into a funding agreement for the Federal Litigation and by providing the
funding contemplated by the 1995 Agreement supports the inference that the funding
agreement included the terms required by the 1995 Agreement.2 Del-Rio admits that
Shaw provided funding for the Federal Litigation,3 but denies that such funding was
1

Only Appellee Del-Rio Resources, Inc. ("Del-Rio") filed a brief in this appeal.
Appellee Dan Shaw ("Shaw") elected not to appear in the appeal.
2

If, in fact, Shaw reached a funding agreement that included the terms contemplated
by the 1995 Agreement, then Plaintiffs would have a right to receive (1) their undivided
share of a 50% beneficial interest in the oil and gas leases obtained as a result of the
settlement of the Federal Litigation and (2) their share of the $300,000 in cash proceeds
generated by that settlement or, in the alternative, damages.
3

Del-Rio claims that Shaw only provided funding to Del-Rio, Aplee's. Br. at 7, but
thatmischaracterizes the contents of Shaw's affidavit. Shaw's affidavit actually says that

.I.

"as contemplated by" the 1995 Agreement. This is a fundamental factual dispute that
cannot be resolved by summary judgment.
In support of its argument, Del-Rio relies on Shaw's affidavit. The affidavit,
however, does not resolve this factual dispute. Shaw does not deny altogether having
reached a funding agreement with the Federal Plaintiffs; such a denial would be implausible because Shaw obviously would not have provided $20,000 in funding without a funding agreement of some kind. Rather, Shaw says only that he did not enter into a funding
agreement "pursuant to" the 1995 Agreement. R. 173 (16). This conclusory assertion
is curious in light of Shaw's simultaneous admission that he provided the funding to the
Federal Plaintiffs that was contemplated by the 1995 Agreement. Yet, Shaw's affidavit
provides no other explanation for why he provided funding to the Federal Plaintiffs if it
were not provided pursuant to the 1995 Agreement. Thus, Shaw's conclusory statement
raises more questions than it answers. Key factual issues that make summary judgment
inappropriate are why and under what circumstances Shaw provided the $20,000 in funding for the Federal Litigation.4
Defendants also submitted an affidavit in support of their motion for summary

he advanced the money to Del-Rio "and the Plaintiffs in the Del-Rio Federal Litigation."
R. 173 (1 6) (emphasis added).
4

Plaintiffs are not required to file a countervailing affidavit in order to avoid
summary judgment. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin. Wright & Miles«
Chartered. 681 P.2d 1258,1261 (Utah 1984). Shaw's conclusory denial, in and of itself,
does not provide a sufficient basis for summary judgment. At a minimum, that denial
raises a credibility issue, given that Shaw admits providing funding to the Federal
Plaintiffs and has provided no other explanation of the basis upon which such funding was
provided. The trial court should not weigh evidence or assess credibility at the summary
judgment stage. Draper Citv v. Estate of Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097,1100-01 (Utah 1995).
For purposes of summary judgment, all inferences must be drawn in favor of Plaintiffs
as the non-moving party. Alder v. Bavor Corp.. 2002 UT 115, f 20, 61 P.3d 1076.
-2-

judgment from Gerald Nielson, the attorney who represented all of the Federal Plaintiffs
in the Federal Litigation. R. 169-171. As the Federal Plaintiffs' attorney, Nielson was
in a position to bind them to a funding agreement with Shaw. Nielson's affidavit, however, is silent on the subject of the funding agreement between Shaw and the Federal
Plaintiffs.5 Therefore, Nielson's affidavit not only fails to corroborate Shaw's statement,
but also provides no alternative explanation for the funding Shaw provided to the Federal
Plaintiffs.
The record upon which summary judgment was granted contains the admitted facts
that Shaw agreed in the 1995 Agreement to seek a funding agreement with the Federal
Plaintiffs, that Shaw in fact reached an agreement to provide funding for the Federal
Litigation, and that he subsequendy provided $20,000 in funding to the Federal Plaintiffs.
These facts are consistent with Shaw's expected performance under the 1995 Agreement
and support a strong inference that he provided the funding pursuant to the terms required
by the 1995 Agreement. Shaw's conclusory affidavit does not dispel that inference. This
is particularly true given the absence of any other explanation for Shaw's performance.
At a very minimum, this is a case in which the summary judgment record gives rise to
differing inferences.

Where, as in this case, conflicting inferences material to the

outcome of the case can be drawn from the facts, summary judgment should not be
granted; only a jury can draw those inferences that are most reasonable. See Goodnow
v. Sullivan. 2002 UT 21, f 13, 44 P.3d 707; Alder v. Bavor Corp..2002 UT 115,1 20,
61 P.3d 1076.
Finally, Plaintiffs' claims should not be short-circuited on the basis of two untested

5

This silence is telling not only because Nielson is in a position to know the truth,
but also because, if Nielson could corroborate Shaw's Statement, such corroboration no
doubt would have been included in Nielson's affidavit.
A-

and uncorroborated words in a summary judgment affidavit.6 As the Utah Supreme Court
observed in Durham v. Margetts. 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977):
The summary judgment procedure has the desirable and salutary purpose of
eliminating the time, trouble and expense of a trial when there are no issues
of fact in dispute and the controversy can be resolved as a matter of law.
Nevertheless, that should not be done on conjecture, but only when the
mater is clear; and in case of doubt, the doubt should be resolved in
allowing the challenged party the opportunity of at least attempting to prove
his right to recover. For that reason the 'submissions' should be looked at
in the light favorable to her position; and unless the court is able to
conclude that there is no dispute on material facts, which if resolved in her
favor would entitie her to recover, the court should not summarily reject her
claim and render judgment against her as a matter of law.
Finally, in its order granting summary judgment, the trial court did not explain the
basis for its decision. Because this Court cannot divine the trial court's reasoning, the
"presumption of correctness" ordinarily afforded trial court rulings has little operative
effect. See Gabriel v. Salt Lake Citv Corp..2001 UT App 277, f 10,34 P.3d237. When
an appellate court cannot determine which of several grounds the trial court ruled upon
in making its ruling, the judgment should be reversed and remanded for further
proceedings. Id. at ff 15 and 20, 238. Also, reversal is required when a trial court
impermissibly weighs the evidence or assumes credibility, which appears to have happened

6

As discussed in more detail below, Plaintiffs requested that the trial court delay
ruling on the motion for summary judgment in order to afford them an opportunity to depose Shaw and Nielson on the subject of the funding agreement. Appellees resisted even
this minimal discovery, and the trial court granted summary judgment without ruling on
this request. This constitutes reversible error, particularly since the facts at issue are in
the sole possession of Defendants and their agent. Shaw and Nielson are the persons with
knowledge of the circumstances under which Shaw provided the funding to the Federal
Plaintiffs. Although Nielson himself is not a defendant in this case, he was the attorney
for Del-Rio, the lead plaintiff in the Federal Litigation which is a defendant in this case,
and he certainly would have knowledge concerning the circumstances under which Shaw
provided funding to Del-Rio and the Federal Plaintiffs.
-4-

in the present case.7 See id.
II.

THE TRIAL COURTS FAILURE TO RULE ON PLAINTIFFS'
RULE 56(F) REQUEST CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR,

Del-Rio argues that the trial court's "denial" of Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) request was
not an abuse of discretion. Aplee's. Br. at 39. This argument has a flawed factual
premise. Here, the trial court did not actually deny Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) request but
granted summary judgment without addressing the Rule 56(f) request. Plaintiffs raised
this point in their opening brief, Aplts.' Br. at 37, but Del-Rio did not respond to it.
Rather, Del-Rio treats this as a case in which a trial court affirmatively denied a
Rule 56(f) request.
In a case where the trial court has not addressed a Rule 56(f) request on the merits,
there is a failure to exercise discretion, not an abuse of discretion. Crossland Savings v.
Hatch. 877 P.2d 1241, 1243, n. 4 (Utah 1994). On appeal, the question is whether the
trial court should have exercised discretion.8 Id. at 1243, n. 4. That is a legal question
which involves de novo review by this Court concerning whether Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f)

7

It appears that the trial court may have concluded that Shaw did not, in fact, enter
into the funding agreement contemplated by the 1995 Agreement. If so, resolution of this
disputed factual issue on summary judgment is clear reversible error.
8

In their opening brief, Plaintiffs treated the trial court's failure to rule on their
Rule 56(f) request as effectively denying that request, and Plaintiffs argued that the
effective denial constituted an abuse of discretion. Aplts.' Br. At 37. Under Crossland
Savings, the correct standard is whether the trial court should have exercised discretion.
Because Plaintiffs clearly stated in their opening brief that the trial court improperly failed
to rule on their Rule 56(f) request, Appellees were on notice of this issue, and it should
not be viewed as being raised for the first time in a reply brief. Even if it were, this
Court may, in its discretion, decide a case upon points that its proper disposition may
require, even if first raised in a reply brief. Romrell v. Zions First National Bank. N.A..
611 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah 1980). Determination of the appropriate standard of appellate
review is a question for the appellate courts and would be appropriately considered at any
point in an appeal.
-5-

request should have been addressed by the trial court.9 However, even if the trial court's
failure to respond to Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) request is viewed as an effective denial of the
request, reversal still would be required because such an effective denial constitutes an
abuse of discretion. The abuse of discretion is especially evident in this case. The factual
conclusion in Shaw's Affidavit, upon which the Court relied in granting summary judgment, was not an allegation which could have been rebutted by a counter-affidavit.
Shaw's conclusion that his funding of the Federal Litigation was not "pursuant to" the
1995 Agreement was a statement only he could explain. Consequendy, the Court's failure
to rule on the Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) motion, which would have allowed for the crossexamination of Shaw on the point, was clearly erroneous. Cross-examination is one of
the most important tools in our system of justice for getting at the truth, yet Plaintiffs
were denied the use of that tool.
III.

PLAINTIFFS' RULE 56(F) REQUEST WAS NOT DILATORY OR
LACKING IN MERIT.

Rule 56(f) requests are to be liberally granted. Strand v. Assoc. Students of Univ.
of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 194 (Utah 1977); Drvsdale v. Ford Motor Co.. 947 P.2d678, 680
(Utah 1977) ("Litigants must be able to present their cases fully to the court before
judgment can be rendered against them unless it is obvious from the evidence before the
court that the party opposing judgment can establish no right to recovery."). Prior to the
completion of discovery, it is often difficult to ascertain whether the nonmoving party will
be able to sustain its claims, and, in such cases, summary judgment generally should be
denied. Drvsdale. 947 P.2d at 680. Before summary judgment is considered by the trial
9

In the Crossland Savings case, the trial court had addressed the merits of the
Rule 56(f) motion. Therefore, while noting that de novo review would be appropriate
where a trial court failed to address a Rule 56(f) request, the appellate court did not have
occasion to apply such review in that case. Here, in contrast, the trial court altogether
failed to exercise discretion, and this Court is called upon to review the matter de novo.
-6-

court, the plaintiff should be afforded every reasonable opportunity to gather whatever
evidence it can in support of its claims. Id. at 681. This rule applies in cases in which
the nonmoving party might be able, through additional discovery including cross-examination, to prove different theories of recovery. Pepper v. Zions First Nat'1 Bank. N.A.,801
P.2d 144, 154 (Utah 1990). Under these liberal standards, a Rule 56(f) request may be
denied only if it is (1) dilatory or (2) lacking in merit. United Park City Mines Co. v.
Greater Park Citv Co.. 870 P.2d 880,893 (Utah 1993). Del-Rio has not demonstrated that
Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) request was either dilatory or lacking in merit.
A.

Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) Request Was Not Dilatory. Del-Rio contends

that Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) request was dilatory because a "full year" elapsed between the
filing of the Complaint and the filing of the motion for summary judgment, with no discovery having been conducted by Plaintiffs. Aplee's. Br. at 39-40. The record reveals,
however, that the complaint was filed on July 23,2001 (R. 1), but Defendants did not file
their answers and counterclaims until April 2002, some nine months later.

R. 10-69

(Shaw); 70-78 (Del-Rio). The pleadings closed on August 7, 2002, with the filing of
Plaintiffs' Reply to Shaw's Counterclaim. R. 227-232.10
The scope of allowable discovery is determined by the claims and defenses, see,
e.g., Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1368 (11th Cir. 1997), and discovery ordinarily will not commence until after the pleadings have closed. See, e.g..
Strand, 561 P.2d 191. Moreover, under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may
not seek discovery from any source before the parties have met and conferred as required
by Rule 26(f). U.R.C.P.26(d). One of the purposes of a Rule 26(f) conference is for the

10

The record also reflects that trial counsel informed the court that substantive
setdement discussions between the parties prior to August 2002 were a cause of the delay
in the closing of pleadings and the lack of discovery. R. 338.
-7-

parties to "discuss the nature and basis of their claims and defenses." U.R.C.P.26(f)(l).
Plaintiffs, therefore, could not conduct discovery until the pleadings closed and the nature
and basis of the claims and defenses were known.
Del-Rio also faults Plaintiffs for not conducting discovery during the three-month
period between the time of the filing of the motion for summary judgment and the hearing
on that motion. Aplee's. Br. at 40. That argument, however, ignores the fact that
Plaintiffs' counsel filed the Rule 56(f) request along with Plaintiffs' opposition to the
motion for summary judgment. R. 243-61. The Rule 56(f) request was filed as soon as
it became clear that Defendants had changed their position to claim that Shaw had not
provided funding to the Federal Plaintiffs "pursuant to" the 1995 Agreement.11 The
requested discovery never occurred because the trial court proceeded instead to hear and
grant the motion for summary judgment without ruling on Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) request.
Thus, contrary to Del-Rio's argument, Plaintiffs were not dilatory but, in fact, timely
sought a delay in the summary judgment ruling in order to conduct necessary discovery.
Plaintiffs should not be prejudiced by the trial court's failure to address that request.12
Finally, Del-Rio ignores the fact that the evidence Plaintiffs sought to discover was
in the possession and control of Defendants or their agents.13 In Strand, 561 P.2d at 194,
the Utah Supreme Court instructed on a similar issue as follows:

11

Plaintiffs twice informed the trial court that Defendants were changing their theory
of the case. (R. 243-55, pp. 4 and 12.)
12

In stating that "the trial court was not required to grant them additional time under
Rule 56(f)," Aplee's. Br. at 40 (emphasis added), Del-Rio begs the question. Even if the
trial court were not required to grant additional time, the trial court was obligated at least
to address the Rule 56(f) request before ruling on summary judgment.
13

Nielson, whose deposition was sought, was not himself a defendant in this litigation.
He was attorney for Del-Rio, which was a defendant.
-8-

The case must, therefore, go back for further proceedings as to this cause
of action in order to afford the plaintiffs an opportunity to produce evidence
of the facts necessary to support the relief for which they ask. It is obvious
that this evidence must come largely from die defendants. This case illustrates the danger of founding a judgment in favor of one party upon his own
version of facts within his sole knowledge as set forth in affidavits prepared
ex parte. Cross examination of the party and a reasonable examination of
his records by the other party frequently bring forth further facts which
place a very different light upon the picture. The plaintiffs should,
therefore, be given a reasonable opportunity, under proper safeguards, to
take the depositions and have the discovery which they seek . . . .
(Citations and internal punctuation omitted.) The reasoning in Strand compels the
conclusion that the Plaintiffs in this case should have been afforded an opportunity to
examine Shaw and Nielson concerning die circumstances under which Shaw admittedly
provided the funding for the Federal Litigation before the trial court ruled on the summary
judgment motion.
B.

Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) Request Was Not Lacking in Merit. For pur-

poses of a Rule 56(f) request, "lacking in merit" means that the request seeks discovery
which will be of no consequence to the determination of the motion for summary judgment. Id.; Holmes v. American States Ins. Co.. 2000 UT App 85, 1 26, 1 P.3d at 558.
Where material facts remain unresolved and the request seeks factual exploration on issues
which could defeat the motion for summary judgment, a Rule 56(f) request is not lacking
in merit. Id.; Salt Lake County v. Western Dairymen Cooperative. Inc.. 2002 UT 39,
f 24,48 P.3d 917.
Del-Rio mistakenly argues that Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) request was lacking in merit
because "the discovery that Appellants wanted to pursue would not have affected the
outcome of the motion." Aplee's. Br. at 40. Plaintiffs were not embarking upon a mere
"fishing expedition" or relying upon vague assertions that additional discovery would
produce needed, but unspecified, facts. Aplee's. Br. at 41. Rather, Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f)
request targeted specific witnesses with specific knowledge on specific fact issues, in-

-Q-

eluding the crucial subject of the terms of the agreement under which Shaw admittedly
provided to the Federal Plaintiffs the funding contemplated by the 1995 Agreement. R.
256-59. Among other things, Plaintiffs specifically sought to depose Shaw and Nielson,
the attorney for the parties who received that funding, on the nature of the funding
agreement between Shaw and the Federal Plaintiffs. R. 257 (1 6).
Furthermore, this is not a case in which Plaintiffs sought discovery irrelevant to
determination of the motion for summary judgment. Defendants' motion for summary
judgment stated in pertinent part as follows:
Instead, the 1995 Agreement contemplates that Shaw and the Federal
Plaintiffs would enter into a subsequent agreement providing for such a
distribution. Once again, because the 1995 Agreement granted Plaintiffs no
rights, and no other agreement was reached granting Plaintiffs any rights.
Plaintiffs have no right under the 1995 Agreement.
R. 92-93 (pp. 11-12) (emphasis added). Unmistakably, Defendants' motion was premised
upon the central factual claim that Shaw did not enter into any funding agreement that
granted Plaintiffs any rights. The Rule 56(f) request was intended to test the factual
basis for that claim, R. 256-259 (f 6), and thus went to a core factual issue. Because the
Rule 56(f) request sought factual exploration of an unresolved issue having a direct bearing upon determination of the summary judgment motion, it cannot be viewed as lacking
in merit.
C.

Plaintiffs' Claims Were Not Based Exclusively On The 1995

Agreement. Del-Rio further contends erroneously that Plaintiffs' claims were based
exclusively upon the 1995 Agreement and that Plaintiffs did not predicate their claims at
all upon the funding Shaw provided to the Federal Plaintiffs. Aplee's. Br. at 14-19.14
The Complaint not only refers to the 1995 Agreement, R. 1 (18), but also specifically
14

If this is true, it is curious that Defendants would bother obtaining an Affidavit
from Dan Shaw addressing the point.
-10-

alleges that Shaw provided funding to the Federal Plaintiffs pursuant to the contemplated
funding agreement. R. 3 (1 14) ("Shaw did in fact fund the lawsuit pursuant to agreement
with plaintiffs."). Del-Rio ignores this paragraph 14 of the Complaint, electing instead
to emphasize only the Complaint's references to the 1995 Agreement. Based upon that
selective presentation, Del-Rio makes the sweeping assertion that" [t]hese passages from
the Complaint demonstrate beyond doubt that the Appellants' claim was based exclusively
on the 1995 Agreement." Aplee's. Br. at 17.
A fair reading of the Complaint, however, compels the conclusion that the agreement referred to in f 14 of the Complaint is different from the 1995 Agreement. When
referring to the 1995 Agreement, the Complaint uses "Agreement" with a capital "A." In
contrast, when referring to Shaw's subsequent ftinding agreement with the Federal Plaintiffs, the Complaint uses the word "agreement" with a lower case "a." R. 3 (t 14). In
paragraph 14, the Complaint also refers to "plaintiffs" with a lower case "p," indicating
that the funding agreement was between Shaw and the Federal Plaintiffs (who are referred
to as "plaintiffs" in the 1995 Agreement.) R. 33-34 fl 4). Thus, paragraph 14 of the
Complaint in fact alleges a funding agreement between Shaw and the Federal Plaintiffs
that is subsequent to and different from the 1995 Agreement, and Plaintiffs are not now
asserting rights from a "different" source." (See Aplee's. Brief at 17-18.)
Del-Rio also argues, without supporting citation, that every equitable or legal right
must have "a" source. Aplee's. Br. at 17. This argument obfuscates the issue by incorrectly suggesting that a claim may have only one source. In reality, a plaintiffs' claim
may be based on an entire course of conduct. Retherford v. AT&T Communications of
Mountain States. Inc.. 844 P.2d 949, 977 (Utah 1992). Here, the 1995 Agreement and
the funding agreement are inseparably linked, and both agreements are part of the course
of conduct upon which Plaintiffs' claims were premised.
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Del-Rio also contends that Plaintiffs did not raise the argument concerning the
funding agreement in the summary judgment proceedings before the trial court and therefore are precluded from doing so now." Aplee's. Br. at 18-19. Del-Rio is incorrect.
First, as discussed above, the Complaint itself alleges both the 1995 Agreement arid the
subsequent funding agreement. Second, Plaintiffs referenced the funding agreement when
opposing the motion for summary judgment. R. 243-255. For example, Plaintiffs stated,
"Similarly, defendants waited until the filing of this action to deny that Shaw entered into
an 'agreement' for funding of the Federal Litigation, which was plaintiffs' 'additional
consideration' for the 1995 Agreement." R. 243 (p. 1). Plaintiffs also said, "Itmakes no
sense that Shaw would fund the Federal Litigation, as he admittedly did, but fail to enter
into an 'agreement' for the funding of that Litigation." R. 244 (p. 2). Thus, Plaintiffs
clearly apprised the trial court that Shaw's performance in providing the contemplated
funding to the Federal Plaintiffs created a factual issue in this case.
Plaintiffs also apprised the trial court of the relevance of the funding agreement to
their claims by filing a Rule 56(f) request seeking to depose Shaw and Nielson concerning
the terms of that funding agreement. Plaintiffs even stressed the centrality of the funding
agreement to disposition of the motion before the trial court by stating, "While plaintiffs
have no basis to deny the statement, given defendants' recent change of theory, plaintiffs
should be permitted discovery on the question since it now appears central to this case."
R. 246 (p. 4) (emphasis added).15 Thus, Plaintiffs not only raised the issue of the
existence of the funding agreement before the trial court, they also emphasized its

15

Plaintiffs' counsel's statement that Plaintiffs did not then have a "basis" to deny the
statement, of course, does not mean that a basis does not exist. Plaintiffs did not thereby
admit that the statement was accurate, and, instead, sought discovery from Defendants, the
persons in possession of the knowledge on the subject.
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importance to the case. Under such circumstances, Del-Rio simply cannot argue that
Plaintiffs failed to present the issue to the trial court.
In summary, the discovery Plaintiffs sought was specifically directed at exploration
of factual issues which could defeat the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs' Rule
56(f) request was neither dilatory nor lacking in merit. The trial court should have
granted diat request before proceeding to rule on the motion for summary judgment, and
its failure to do so is a reversible failure to exercise its discretion.
IV.

GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST CONCERNING
THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH SHAW PROVIDED FUNDING TO THE FEDERAL PLAINTIFFS AND
WHETHER THAT AGREEMENT GRANTS PLAINTIFFS ANY ENFORCEABLE RIGHTS IN THE OIL CANYON LEASES OR THE
SETTLEMENT PROCEEDS.

Del-Rio next contends that the 1995 Agreement is not sufficiendy specific to grant
Plaintiffs any definable or enforceable rights in any of the Oil Canyon Leases. Aplee's.
Br.,pp. 19-38. The fundamental reasons why those arguments are not well taken may be
summarized as follows:
A.

The 1995 Agreement Is Not The Sole Basis For Plaintiffs' Claims.

Del-Rio argues first that Plaintiffs have admitted that the 1995 Agreement does not grant
them rights in the Oil Canyon Leases and, therefore, have conceded that the "only theory"
pursued in the Complaint and argued below is insufficient to support a judgment in their
favor. Aplee's. Br. at 19-20. This argument is defective in a number of respects. First,
it misstates Plaintiffs' argument. Plaintiffs actually stated that the 1995 Agreement, in and
of itself, does not grant them such interests. Aplts.' Br. at 15. Plaintiffs have never limited their claim to the 1995 Agreement alone. Rather, as demonstrated above, Plaintiffs
consistentiy pled and argued a theory of recovery based upon both the 1995 Agreement
and the subsequent funding agreement that was contemplated in the 1995 Agreement.
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Second, contrary to Del-Rio's argument, Plaintiffs are not required to establish that
they are entitled to judgment in their favor in order to defeat Appellees' motion for
summary judgment. Plaintiffs need only establish that there are genuine issues of material
fact that render summary judgment for Defendants inappropriate. The unresolved factual
issues of why and under what terms Shaw provided the $20,000 in funding for the Federal
Litigation to the Federal Plaintiffs more than meets this standard. Plaintiffs are entitled
to conduct discovery concerning this factual dispute and then to have this factual issue
resolved at trial. Only then can it be determined whether Plaintiffs are entitied to a
judgment.
B.

This Is Not An "AgreementTo Agree" Case. Del-Rio next contends

that paragraphs 4 and 4.1 of the 1995 Agreement constitute an "agreement to agree."
Aplee's. Br. at 20. As Del-Rio observes, "agreements to agree" can be unenforceable "to
the extent that they leave open material terms for future consideration." Harmon v.
Greenwood. 596 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1979). The language of paragraphs 4 and 4.1 of
the 1995 Agreement, however, contain nothing indicating that the parties to the 1995
Agreement left open any material terms for future consideration. To the contrary, they
require Shaw to use his best efforts to enter into a funding agreement with the Federal
Plaintiffs to include the terms specified in paragraphs 4, 4.1 and 4.2.16 Thus, paragraphs
4,4.1 and 4.2 of the 1995 Agreement actually reflect a meeting of the minds between the
parties to the 1995 Agreement in which Shaw had specific marching orders. Those paragraphs do not constitute an "agreement to agree."

16

In arguing "agreement to agree," Del-Rio loses sight of the fact that, although the
1995 Agreement contemplates a subsequent agreement between Shaw and other parties
(i.e. the Federal Plaintiffs), the 1995 Agreement, including paragraphs 4 and 4.1, reflects
a completed statement of the understanding of the parties to the 1995 Agreement.
AA.

The facts also establish that Shaw followed his marching orders by entering into
the contemplated agreement with the Federal Plaintiffs pursuant to which he provided the
funding contemplated by the 1995 Agreement. The issue in this case is not whether the
parties to the 1995 Agreement had a meeting of the minds-they clearly did, and the facts
show that Shaw performed in accordance with that agreement. The issue is under what
terms did Shaw provide the funding to Del-Rio and the other Federal Plaintiffs. That
disputed factual issue remains unexplored and can only be resolved at trial.
C.

Paragraphs 4. 4.L And 4.2 Of The 1995 Agreement Are Not Too

Indefinite To Be Enforceable. Leaving aside the red herring argument of "agreement to
agree," Del-Rio next asserts, in the alternative, that paragraphs 4,4.1, and 4.2 of the 1995
Agreement are "too indefinite to be enforceable because there are no guidelines for determining what interest any of the Federal Plaintiffs were supposed to receive under the contemplated funding agreement." Aplee's. Br. at 20. This argument also is flawed.
First and foremost, Del-Rio's argument wrongfully presumes that the subsequent
funding agreement contained only the terms expressly required by paragraphs 4, 4.1 and
4.2. As discussed above, Plaintiffs were not allowed to conduct discovery concerning the
terms of the subsequent funding agreement before the trial court entered summary judgment. As a result, and because neither Shaw nor Nielson included any explanation of
these terms in their affidavits, the record contains no direct evidence of the terms of the
subsequent funding agreement. Shaw's admission that he entered into an agreement to
provide funding for the Federal Litigation and then provided such funding to the Federal
Plaintiffs after he signed the 1995 Agreement offers compelling support for the inference
that he was acting pursuant to the 1995 Agreement. Defendants have offered no facts that
he was providing the funding on terms other than the terms required by the 1995
Agreement.

Even if it is assumed that the funding agreement under which Shaw admittedly
provided funding to the Federal Plaintiffs contained only the terms required by the 1995
Agreement, the subsequent funding agreement would still be sufficiently definite to be
enforceable.
1.

Paragraphs 4. 4.1 And 4.2 Identify The Contemplated Parties

For The Funding Agreement. Del-Rio argues first that paragraphs 4 and 4.1 provide no
guidelines to determine which of the twenty-seven Federal Plaintiffs were supposed to
enter into the subsequent agreement with Shaw. Aplee's. Br. at 22. This argument cannot
withstand analysis. First, paragraph 4 of the 1995 Agreement identifies "plaintiffs" as the
various individuals and companies who "are plaintiffs in a lawsuit filed against the United
States Claims Courts

(Case No. 569-86L)." R. 106 (1 4, p. 3). Thus, the group of

"plaintiffs" is identified and discernible.
Second, Del-Rio's argument ignores the true makeup of the Federal Plaintiffs.
Del-Rio and Plaintiffs all were plaintiffs in the Federal Litigation. Del-Rio, Syndicators
and Western between mem accounted for the vast majority of the cost-bearing (i.e. working interest) interests in the Oil Canyon Leases. They confirmed their agreement to be
bound by the stated terms for the contemplated funding agreement by signing the 1995
Agreement. All of the other Federal Plaintiffs had assigned, or had agreed to, and
ultimately did assign, their interests to Del-Rio. Aplee's. Br. At 4; R. 165-168 (f 9).
They were overriding royalty interest owners who never claimed any cost-bearing interest
in the Oil Canyon Leases. Thus, there were not truly twenty-seven separate Federal
Plaintiffs who had to be parties under the Shaw funding agreement.
Contrary to Del-Rio's argument, Aplee's. Br. at 27, Plaintiffs did not "posit" that
a funding agreement between Shaw and Del-Rio which purported to allocate the 50%
beneficial interest only to Del-Rio would have satisfied paragraph 4.1 of the 1995
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Agreement.

Rather, Plaintiffs merely noted that if Shaw entered into the funding

agreement with Nielson, as the attorney for the Federal Plaintiffs, or with Del-Rio, as the
lead plaintiff, such funding agreement would have been with "the plaintiffs" in the Federal
Litigation because Nielson and/or Del-Rio, in their capacities as attorney and lead
plaintiff, respectively, would have been acting as agent for and on behalf of all of the
Federal Plaintiffs.17
2.

Paragraph 4.1 Identifies The Type Of Interest To Be Assigned.

Del-Rio also argues that the 1995 Agreement does not identify "what type" or "extent" of
interest was to be assigned. Aplee's. Br. at 22. Del-Rio attempts to create uncertainty
by arguing that there are several different types of "interests" possible in an oil and gas
lease, and it conjures up a variety of hypotfietical questions in regard to different interest
scenarios.18 Aplee's. Br. at 23-24. These hypothetical are, however, irrelevant because
paragraph 4.1 of the 1995 Agreement does specify that Plaintiffs are to receive a 50%

17

Del-Rio incorrectly argues that the fact that Plaintiffs did not offer evidence in the
trial court of their understanding of the meaning of paragraphs 4 and 4.1 suggests that
they had no such understanding. Aplee's. Br. At 28. This is absurd. Plaintiffs relied on
Nielson and Del-Rio to manage the Federal Litigation and were not involved in the negotiation of the subsequent funding agreement. Plaintiffs relied on Del-Rio, Shaw and
Nielson to follow the formula set out in the 1995 Agreement. The fact that Shaw provided the funding for the Federal Litigation contemplated by the 1995 Agreement strongly
suggests that the funding was in fact provided on the terms required by the 1995
Agreement. At minimum, this creates a genuine issue of material fact that can only be
resolved at trial.
18

Del-Rio raises several hypothetical fact scenarios under which "the funding agreement between Shaw and the Federal Plaintiffs could have assigned" interests to certain i.e. less than all of - the Federal Plaintiffs. Aplee's. Br. at 27. The Court should not
waste time engaging in such speculation. There are no facts in this record that Shaw did
any such thing; indeed, Shaw has failed to come forward with any explanation of why and
under what terms Shaw provided the funding to the Federal Plaintiffs. This is precisely
why Plaintiffs needed to be able to depose Shaw and Nielson in order to fully respond to
the motion for summary judgment.
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beneficial interest in any additional leases awarded as a result of the Federal Litigation.
The clear import of the 1995 Agreement was that the funding agreement would require
that tide to any additional leases awarded as a result of the Federal Litigation would be
assigned to Shaw, subject to the Federal Plaintiffs' 50% beneficial interest in those leases.
The precise interests covered by the additional leases could not, of course, be determined
until the additional leases were awarded and assigned to Shaw.19
Carter v. Sorenson. 2004 UT 33, 498 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2004 WL 834216
(April 20,2004), cited by Del-Rio, Aplee's. Br. at 29, does not change this result. Carter
involved an option contract which contained no ascertainable price term. Here, in
contrast, Paragraph 4.1 of the 1995 Agreement does specify the interest which the Federal
Plaintiffs are to receive. Therefore, paragraph 4.1 on its face does not fail for lack of a
material term.
3.

The Best Efforts Obligation Is Not Indefinite. Del-Rio next

argues that the "best efforts" provision of the lease adds "another layer of indefmiteness
to the 1995 Agreement . . . ." Aplee's. Br. at 24. This issue is, at best, premature.20
19

Del-Rio argues that the contract fails for indefmiteness because it does not specify
the fraction of the 50% beneficial interest to be allocated to the Plaintiffs. Id. This does
not follow. The Federal Plaintiffs could hold the 50% beneficial interest joindy or it
could be allocated among the Federal Plaintiffs. Assuming it was allocated, the working
50 % beneficial interest would be divided between the Federal Plaintiffs and would, of
course, be subject to agreement of the Federal Plaintiffs. The funding agreement between
Shaw and the Federal Plaintiffs, as a group, need not address this issue in order to be
enforceable.
20

The trial court did not base its summary judgment ruling upon a determination that
the "best efforts" provision was unenforceable for failure to include guidelines against
which the parties' best efforts could be measured. Indeed, to the contrary, the trial court
granted leave to amend to assert a claim for breach of the best efforts provision. R 28889. As Del-Rio notes, Aplee's. Br. at 34, Plaintiffs did amend their complaint to include
a claim for breach of Shaw's "best efforts" obligation under the 1995 Agreement. R. 28084. That claim was not pursued and was dismissed without prejudice in November 2003
-18-

It is undisputed that Shaw in fact provided funding to the Federal Plaintiffs. Therefore,
the initial question is whether, as Plaintiffs maintain, he provided that funding pursuant
to the funding agreement contemplated by the 1995 Agreement. If so, he clearly fulfilled
his best efforts obligation. That factual issue remains unresolved. Unless and until
it is determined that Shaw did not provide the funding as contemplated by the 1995
Agreement, no issue of breach of the "best efforts" provision arises.21
4.

Plaintiffs Do Not Seek To Recover More Than They Bargained

For In The 1995 Agreement. Del-Rio also argues that granting Plaintiffs interests in the
Oil Canyon Leases would be to give Plaintiffs more than they agreed to accept (and Shaw
and Del-Rio agreed to grant) in the 1995 Agreement. Aplee's. Br. at 26. This simply is
incorrect. Part of the consideration for the 1995 Agreement was Shaw's agreement to use
his best efforts to enter into a funding agreement with the Federal Plaintiffs that would
include the terms identified in the 1995 Agreement. The undisputed fact that Shaw subsequently provided the contemplated funding to the Federal Plaintiffs strongly suggests that
Shaw in fact entered into and performed under the funding agreement contemplated in the
1995 Agreement. It was Shaw's funding that made it possible for the Federal Plaintiffs
to get (he Oil Canyon Leases that were ultimately awarded in the Federal Litigation.
Plaintiffs merely seek to enforce their rights under the funding agreement that was

in order to avoid additional litigation costs pending disposition of this appeal.
21

Even if the issue were ripe, Del-Rio's attempt to draw an analogy to Brown's Shoe
Fit v. Olch. 955 P.2d 357 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) is inapt. Aplee's. Br. at 24-5. As noted
above, the 1995 Agreement did specify the interest Plaintiffs were to receive under the
funding agreement, and the best efforts provision was binding upon Shaw, who was a
party to the 1995 Agreement.
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contemplated by the 1995 Agreement.
V.

THE OIL CANYON LEASES ARE "ADDITIONAL LEASES1 AS
THAT TERM IS USED IN THE 1995 AGREEMENT.

Del-Rio also argues that Plaintiffs have no interests in the ten Oil Canyon Leases
that were reinstated as a result of the settlement of the Federal Litigation because "as a
matter of law, those leases are not the 'additional leases' contemplated by paragraph 4.1
of the 1995 Agreement." Aplee's. Br. 35. This argument is both factually and legally
incorrect.
The term "additional leases" is not defined in the 1995 Agreement. Therefore,
unless the term is clear and unambiguous, the court must resort to evidence of the
intention of the parties to determine the meaning of the term and cannot resolve that
factual issue on summary judgment. See Records v. Briggs. 887 P.2d 864, 871 (Ut. Ct.
App. 1994). Del-Rio's argument is based entirely on its claim that the term "additional
leases" can only refer to leases that may have been awarded "m addition to the leases that
the Federal plaintiffs already held . . . ." Aplee's. Br. at 35. The obvious flaw in this
argument is that, at the time the 1995 Agreement was signed, the Federal Litigation Plaintiffs did not hold the Oil Canyon Leases. Rather, those leases admittedly already had expired. R. 167 (f 8). The Federal Plaintiffs sought monetary relief in the United States
Claims Court based upon the value of the lost Oil Canyon Leases. R. 156-157 (f 8),

In connection with this argument, Del-Rio asserts that "Defendants have always recognized the record tide, working, and royalty ownership interests that existed in die Oil
Canyon Leases when the Federal Litigation began." Aplee's. Br. at 31. Yet, Del-Rio's
Counterclaim seeks a declaration that Plaintiffs "have no interest in the 10 federal oil and
gas leases referenced above." R. 70-78 (f 50A). Del-Rio's and Shaw's counterclaims
were not resolved by the trial court's Order and remain pending before the trial court.
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rather than bringing suit elsewhere for reinstatement of the ten expired leases.
The terminology used in the Federal Litigation settlement - that the leases were
"tolled" during the period of that litigation and were "extended" for three years after the
Federal Litigation was dismissed - is nothing more than a drafting artifice employed for
purposes of settlement. The wording in that settlement document cannot change the actual
fact that the Oil Canyon Leases had expired, and thus no longer existed, before the 1995
Agreement was signed. The unexpected "reinstatement" of these expired leases in 2001
as part of the settlement of the Federal Litigation merely confirms that these leases were
awarded as a result of the Federal Litigation, and thus fall within the scope of paragraph
4.1.
More importantly, Del-Rio's argument ignores the fact that the Oil Canyon Leases
were not specifically referred to in the 1995 Agreement. Instead, the only leases specifically referred to in the 1995 Agreement were the Flat Rock Leases that were described
in the Exhibits attached to the 1995 Agreement and were being assigned to Shaw upon
execution of the 1995 Agreement. R. 104. Because the 1995 Agreement refers specifically only to the Flat Rock Leases, any other leases, including, but not limited to, the Oil
Canyon Leases, would be "additional leases" as that term is used in the 1995 Agreement.
Plaintiffs maintain that their interpretation of the term "additional leases" is the only
reasonable interpretation under these facts. At a minimum, these facts reasonably support
23

Plaintiffs' interpretation of the phrase "additional leases" finds further support in the
language used in the proposed distribution of the Federal Litigation Settlement Res.
There, Del-Rio referred to the leases resulting from the Federal Litigation as "returned"
leases. R. 343 (fourth paragraph: "The first asset is the value of the returned leases themselves."). If the Federal Litigation plaintiffs already held the leases, those leases would
not have had to be returned. Conversely, if those leases were being returned, then, by
necessary implication, they were leases which had been taken away from and were no
longer owned by the Federal Litigation plaintiffs. In other words, the returned leases were
"additional" leases awarded to the Federal Litigation plaintiffs.
_oi_

Plaintiffs' interpretation of the term "additional leases" as used in the 1995 Agreement.
The term cannot be considered clear and unambiguous on its face and may not be construed as a matter of law. See Orlob v. Wasatch Management. 2001 UT at 287,1 12, 33
P.3d 1078.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the farther one goes into examination of Del-Rio's
arguments in favor of summary judgment, the clearer it becomes that those arguments depend upon semantics, conjecture, and disputed facts. A motion for summary judgment
should be granted only in a clear case and certainly not in the face of uncertainty as to the
existence and content of agreements and the intentions of the contracting parties thereto.
On this record, there can be no doubt that there are numerous factual issues which must
be, but were not, properly resolved. Accordingly, the trial court erred in disposing of the
case on summary judgment.
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of June, 2004.
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